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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Considering the erroneous mailing of the second check and the banking
custom as to the routine handling of checks, the court further reasoned that
an opposite holding would require a receiving bank to question even those
persons who were known to the bank and who were presenting checks in
routine business from makers also known to the bank and that such a require-
ment would hamper business and the banking process. This was not the intent
of the legislature in passing Section 3-406.
COMMENT
(1). It was unnecessary for the court to find that a forgery had been com-
mitted. Plunkett's signature was clearly unauthorized within the meaning of
Section 1-201(43) and this is all that Section 3-406 requires.
(2). The court did not state whether the plaintiff was a "holder in due
course" or "other payor" under Section 3-406, thus avoiding a problem posed
by the Code itself: Is the transferee of an unauthorized signor a "holder"
under the Code?
Technically, it seems that such a transferee is not a holder. Under Section
3-404(1), an unauthorized signature is "wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed." As a result, there is no negotiation of the in-
strument to the transferee under Section 3-202(1), and without this the
transferee is not a holder under Section 1-201(20). See Stone & Webster
Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358
(1962). This does not mean that "holder in due course" must be deleted from
Section 3-406. The section also mentions the defense of material alteration,
and even though an unauthorized signature completely undermines a person's
status as a holder under the Code, a material alteration does not do so. See,
e.g., Section 3-407.
The plaintiff bank, therefore, qualified for Section 3-406 protection under
"other payor," not "holder in due course." In view of this fact, the second
part of the court's opinion, seemingly offered as an independent ground for
its decision, takes on added importance. Under Section 3-406, an "other payor"
must show that he paid the instrument "in accordance with the reasonable
standards of .. . fhisl business."
R.G.K.
SECTION 3-407. Alteration
GOLDEN DAWN FOODS, INC. V. CEKUTA
205 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-403, supra.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-103. Variation by Agreement; Measure of Damages;
Certain Action Constituting Ordinary Care
ROCK ISLAND AUCTION SALES, INC. V. EMPIRE PACKING Co.
204 N.E.2d 721 (III. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-302, infra.
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SECTION 4-104. Definitions and Index of Definitions
ROCK ISLAND AUCTION SALES, INC. V. EMPIRE PACKING CO. -
204 N.E.2d 721 (M. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-302, infra.
SECTION 4-214. Insolvency and Preference
ROCK ISLAND AUCTION SALES, INC. V. EMPIRE PACKING Co.
204 N.E.2d 721 (III. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-302, infra.
SECTION 4-302. Payor Bank's Responsibility for Late
Return of Item
ROCK ISLAND AUCTION SALES, INC. V. EMPIRE PACKING Co.
204 N.E.2d 721 (III. 1965)
On September 24, 1962, the plaintiff sold cattle to Empire Packing Co.,
and received its check in payment. The plaintiff immediately deposited the
check with an Iowa bank which forwarded it to the defendant payor bank.
Although Empire's balance was inadequate to pay the check, the defendant
held it upon Empire's assurances that additional funds would be deposited.
On October 2, 1962, the defendant bank marked the check "not sufficient
funds" and returned it to the depository bank. The check was never paid.
On December 13, 1962, Empire was adjudicated a bankrupt. The plaintiff
then brought suit against the defendant payor bank to recover the amount of
the check contending that because the defendant bank held the check beyond
the time limit fixed by Sections 4-302 and - 104(h) of the Illinois Code with-
out paying, returning or giving notice of dishonor, it was liable for the amount
of the check. The circuit court found for the plaintiff and the supreme court
affirmed. In reaching its decision, the supreme court specifically rejected three
of the defendant's defenses.
The defendant first contended that the amount for which it was liable
was to be determined by Section 4-103(5), not Section 4-302. In support of
this contention, the defendant pointed out that, unlike the other provisions of
Article 4 which fix liability, Section 4-302 uses the word "accountable." The
use of this word meant that the defendant had to account only for (1) what-
ever funds it held on deposit for Empire Packing Co., and (2) the damages,
as measured by Section 4-103(5), sustained by the plaintiff because of the
defendant's failure to meet its deadline. The court rejected this contention on
the grounds that Section 4-302 specifically rendered the defendant account-
able for the full amount of the check, that "accountable" is synonymous with
"liable" and that "accountable" was used to accommodate other sections of
Article 4 relating to provisional and final settlements between banks in the
collection process, and to bar the possibility of a payor bank being liable to
the owner of the item and to another bank.
The defendant's second contention, that Section 4-302 violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution since it imposes a liability on a payor
bank for failing to act seasonably that is more severe than that imposed on a
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depository or collecting bank for the same default, was similarly discarded.
The court indicated that banks cannot be separated into payor, depository,
or collecting banks, but that all banks perform all three functions. It con-
cluded that the legislature may have found legitimate differences in these
functions to warrant different treatment. As such, Section 4-302 does not
create an irrational classification which violates constitutional limitations.
The defendant finally contended that Section 4-214 was an unconstitu-
tional attempt to control the distribution of assets of insolvent national banks
and that the invalidity of this section rendered Article 4 void in its entirety.
In dismissing this contention, the court noted that according to the Comments
to Section 4 -214, this section is intended to apply to state banks even if it
cannot apply to national banks. In any event, if Section 4-214 were unconsti-
tutional, its invalidity would have no effect on Section 4-302 by virtue of the
severability provision of Section 1-108.
S.L.B.
SECTION 4-403. Customer's Right to Stop Payment;
Burden of Proof of Loss
CICCI V_ LINCOLN NAT'L BANK & TRUST Co.
260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Syracuse City Ct. 1965)
On November 10, 1964, the plaintiff drew a $3,000 check on the defend-
ant bank payable to the order of Joseph Santo. On December 10, 1964, the
plaintiff ordered the defendant to stop payment on the Santo check. The
defendant, nevertheless, honored the check and reduced the plaintiff's bank
account by $3,000. The plaintiff then brought this action "for wrongful pay-
ment of a check . . . after receipt . .. of a timely stop payment order"
under Section 4-403 of the Code and moved for summary judgment. The
defendant in answer pleaded two affirmative defenses: (1) the check was void
"as payment in an unlawful gambling transaction," estopping the plaintiff
from any claim against the defendant; and (2) the check was given as a loan
which had not been repaid or discharged and the plaintiff, therefore, had not
suffered a loss as a result of its action.
The court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's first
defense on the ground that the action was not on the check, but for wrongful
payment of the check pursuant to Section. 4-403.
The defendant's second defense, on the other hand, was sustained and
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied. The court held that
"where a depositor and the maker of a check moves for summary judgment
pursuant to Section 4-403 . . it is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case to
allege and . . prove that he has been damaged by reason of the bank's
wrongful payment . . ." The plaintiff had merely stated in his claim that
his bank account had been reduced by the amount of the check. This was not
a "loss" within the meaning of Section 4-403.
A.S.G.
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SECTION 4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report
Unauthorized Signature or Alteration
WUEST BROS., INC, V. LIBERTY NAT'L BANK & TRUST CO.
388 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1965)
Over a period of eighteen months, the plaintiff's bookkeeper forged sev-
enteen checks totalling $19,900. These checks were drawn on the defendant
bank which returned the cancelled checks to the plaintiff monthly. When an
audit of the plaintiff's accounts uncovered the forgeries, the defendant refused
to make good the loss. The plaintiff instituted this action alleging that the
defendant had not exercised ordinary care in honoring the forged checks. A
verdict was returned for the defendant. The plaintiff, however, was awarded
the amount of the first check forged.
This court sustained the trial court's finding that the defendant had ex-
ercised reasonable care and its instruction to the jury to find for the defendant
if it determined that the plaintiff had been negligent in examining the can-
celled checks each month, but to award the plaintiff the amount of the first
check forged even if the plaintiff were negligent.
The court noted that while the Uniform Commercial Code was not in
effect when the forgeries occurred, Sections 4-406(1), (2) (a), (b) and (3) are
in harmony with this result and would control similar cases in the future.
S.L.B.
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
SECTION 7-303. Diversion; Reconsignment; Change
of I nstructions
KORESKA V. UNITED CARGO CORP,
258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1965)
The plaintiff, an Austrian manufacturer of thermographic copying paper,
sold or contracted to sell four containers of the paper to a New York buyer,
Parker Whitney. The defendant, an operator of a container delivery service
between the United States and Europe, issued a negotiable bill of lading to
Allgemeine, a forwarding agency, for the shipment of the four containers.
The document named the plaintiff's collecting agent, Bankers Trust, as con-
signee, required that the arrival notice be sent to Parker Whitney and further
provided that delivery was to be made only on surrender of the original bill
of lading. When the goods arrived in New York, the defendant delivered
them to Parker Whitney without requiring the original bill and before the
plaintiff had received his purchase price. In a suit by the plaintiff against the
defendant to recover the value of the copying paper, the defendant contended
that it had been excused from requiring the original bill before delivering the
goods by an oral waiver made by the plaintiff's agent, Allgemeine, and also
by a trade custom and course of dealing. The defendant specifically alleged
that Abbe, Allgemeine's representative in New York, had orally requested
that delivery be made in the usual manner, i.e., without requiring the original
bill of lading; that for the convenience of both shipper and consignee, it had
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